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I. INTRODUCTION
Since September 11, 2001, President George W Bush's Administration has repeat-
edly asserted the state secrets privilege as grounds for the dismissal of civil cases chal-
lenging the legality of its conduct in the war on terror. Specifically, the Administration
has sought dismissal of all cases challenging two different government practices: (1) its
use of "extraordinary rendition," under which the Executive removes suspected terror-
ists to foreign countries for interrogation; and (2) the National Security Agency's
(NSA's) warrantless wiretapping of electronic communications. The government ar-
gues that the plaintiffs' claims in these cases can neither be proven nor defended against
without disclosure of information that would jeopardize national security, and thus it
seeks to have all cases related to these activities dismissed on the pleadings.
This issue brief provides a general overview of the state secrets privilege and then
discusses the Bush Administration's recent assertion of the privilege in cases challeng-
ing extraordinary rendition and the NSA's warrantless wiretapping program. As will
be explained, the Administration's blanket invocation of the privilege as grounds for
immediate dismissal of these categories of cases is unprecedented, and threatens to
eliminate the judiciary's role as a check on executive action. For that reason, courts
should seek methods of protecting privileged material without dismissing litigation,
as they have successfully done in the past, to ensure that legitimate challenges to these
and other government actions get a fair hearing in court. In addition, the next presi-
dential administration should revise its internal procedures and work with courts to
limit the effect of the state secrets privilege so that it is used as originally intended,
rather than as a de facto attempt to immunize executive action from judicial review.
Finally, Congress should move quickly to pass pending legislation that would prevent
indiscriminate use of the state secrets privilege.
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II. THE ORIGINS OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
The privilege was first explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in its 1953 deci-
sion in United States v. Reynolds.2 Reynolds involved a claim for damages against the
federal government brought by the widows of three civilians killed in the crash of a
B-29 aircraft. During discovery, plaintiffs sought production of the U.S. Air Force's
official accident investigation reports and statements made by three surviving crew
members. The United States objected, claiming that it had constitutional authority to
refuse to disclose information related to national security 3 The Supreme Court re-
jected this "broad proposition[]1," 4 but explicitly noted for the first time the existence
of a privilege to protect military and state secrets.
As described in Reynolds, the state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary
privilege that accords with the President's authority over national security' The privi-
lege can be asserted only by the head of an executive branch agency with control over
state secrets, and only after that person has filed an affidavit demonstrating that he or
she has personally reviewed the information at issue and determined that it qualifies
as state secrets.6 The court itself must ultimately decide whether the evidence is ad-
missible.7 The Reynolds Court accepted the government's representations about the
classified nature of the materials and refused to require their disclosure. The Court
remanded the case so that litigation could proceed, declaring that "it should be pos-
sible for respondents to adduce essential facts as to causation without resort to mate-
rial touching upon military secrets."
Unfortunately, Reynolds left the contours of the privilege unclear. The Supreme
Court did not describe the specific types of information that qualified for protection
as a "state secret," or explain how courts should determine whether the privilege has
been properly asserted. Unsurprisingly, lower courts have differed in their application
of the privilege. Extrapolating from the brief description of the privilege in Reynolds,
lower courts have concluded that it can affect litigation in a number of ways. First, it
is clear from the result in Reynolds that the privilege can bar evidence from admission
in litigation. The plaintiff's case will then go forward without the excluded evidence,
and will be dismissed only if the plaintiff is unable to prove the prima facie elements
of the claim without it. Second, lower courts have concluded that if the privilege de-
prives the defendant of information that would provide a valid defense, then the court
may grant summary judgment for the defendant. And third, some courts have held
that "if the 'very subject matter of the action' is a state secret, then the court should
dismiss the plaintiff's action based solely on the invocation of the state secrets
2 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953). Although this was the first case in which the Court
explicitly recognized the privilege, the Court stated that the privilege was "well established," stretching
back at least to the 1807 trial of Aaron Burr for treason. Id. at 9. For an in depth discussion of the
Reynolds litigation, see Louis FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 29-118 (2006).
3 Brief for the United States at *9-*10, *15-*16, *21-*22, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953),
1952 WL 82378.
4 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6.
s Id. at 6-12.
6 Id. at 7-8.
7 Id. at 8.
The accident report was eventually declassified and, according to Louis Fisher, "revealed . . serious
negligence by the government" but "contained nothing that could be called state secrets." Fisher, supra
note 2, at xi.
9 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
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privilege."o However, as explained below, the Supreme Court has only taken such
drastic action in the very narrow category of cases involving covert espionage agree-
ments, and it is not clear that the Court ever intended the evidentiary privilege it rec-
ognized in Reynolds to serve as a jurisdictional bar.
Although Reynolds is the first explicit recognition of a state secrets privilege, it was
not the first time the government claimed that litigation threatened national security.
The 1875 decision in Totten v. United States is one of the Court's earliest cases ad-
dressing the issue, and is also one of only two cases in which the Court ordered that
the case must be dismissed because its "very subject matter" concerned secret evi-
dence." Totten involved a contract dispute between a Union spy and President
Abraham Lincoln. The contract, which the parties entered into in July 1861, provided
that the spy was to travel behind rebel lines and transmit information about the
Confederate Army in return for payment of $200 per month. The spy performed the
tasks agreed upon, but was reimbursed only for his expenses. The Supreme Court
concluded that although President Lincoln had the authority to enter into the con-
tract, no court could enforce it. The Court then stated: "[A]s a general princi-
ple ... public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial
of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself re-
gards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be
violated." 12 Accordingly, the Court dismissed the case.
Totten was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Tenet v. Doe, a case in
which two former spies claimed that the government had reneged on its agreement to
provide lifetime support for them in the United States in return for espionage services
in their native country.13 Their complaint alleged that the government had violated
their equal protection and due process rights by refusing to abide by the terms of their
original agreement. The Supreme Court held that the so-called "Totten bar" precludes
judicial review of any claim based on a covert agreement to engage in espionage for
the United States. 14 Aside from these two cases concerning the terms of covert espio-
nage agreements, the Supreme Court has never required the dismissal of litigation on
the ground that it concerns state secrets.
III. THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
A. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNPRECEDENTED
ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE
Reynolds admonished that the state secrets privilege "is not to be lightly invoked,""
and for over two decades following that decision the government rarely asserted the
privilege. Starting in 1977, however, the privilege was raised with greater frequency by
both Democratic and Republican administrations. The privilege was asserted two
times between 1961 and 1970, 14 times between 1971 and 1980, 23 times between 1981
and 1990, 26 times between 1991 and 2000.6
10 Kasza v. Browner, 133 E3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26).
11 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 n.11 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)).
12 Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
13 Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
14 See id. at 3.
iS Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
16 See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007), app.
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From 2001 through 2006 both the number of invocations of the privilege and the
occasions on which the Administration sought to dismiss a case in its entirety in-
creased significantly. A recent article reviewed all the published cases in which the
government has invoked the state secrets privilege since Reynolds. The author found
that in its first six years, the Bush Administration has raised the privilege 20 times,
which amounts to 28% more cases per year than in the previous decade. 17 The sample
size is small, and it is hard to draw conclusions from published decisions alone." But
to the degree that the published cases provide any insight into the policy of the Bush
Administration, they are consistent with the conclusion that it has used the privilege
with greater frequency than ever before.19
Furthermore, and of greater significance, the Bush Administration's recent asser-
tion of the privilege differs from past practice in that it is seeking blanket dismissal of
every case challenging the constitutionality of specific, ongoing government pro-
grams. The data show that the Bush Administration sought dismissal in 92% more
cases per year than in the previous decade. 20 By comparison, the government respond-
ed to lawsuits brought in the 1970s and 1980s challenging its warrantless surveillance
programs by seeking to limit discovery, and only rarely filed motions to dismiss the
entire litigation.21 The current practice represents a marked change not only in the
number of assertions of the privilege, but also in the degree to which it is aimed at
restricting access to the courts.
The Bush Administration has asserted the privilege in every case challenging two
controversial government practices: (1) the use of extraordinary rendition, under
which the United States transfers foreigners suspected of having ties to terrorist orga-
nizations to foreign countries for interrogation; and (2) the NSA's warrantless wire-
tapping program, under which the NSA has eavesdropped on electronic communica-
tions without first obtaining a warrant. In these cases, the Executive has invoked the
state secrets privilege, not just as grounds for excluding specific pieces of evidence, but
as a basis for having all litigation challenging these two programs dismissed with
prejudice prior to discovery. The government makes almost identical arguments re-
garding the need for dismissal in each of the extraordinary rendition and NSA war-
rantless wiretapping cases. Summarized below are two cases in each category to give
17 Id. The government has asserted the privilege even more frequently since 2006. In Conner v. AT&T,
the government informed the court that it "intends to assert the military and state secrets privilege in all
of the[] actions" pending against the telephone company that allegedly provided the United States access
to telephone communications without a warrant, and would "seek their dismissal." No. CV F 06-0632,
2006 WL 1817094, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2006).
s As Professor Chesney is careful to note, using published decisions as the basis for determining the
frequency of a particular administration's assertion of the privilege is problematic. Chesney, supra note
16, at 1301-02. The Executive's claims may often be decided in unpublished rulings that are not available
for analysis. Furthermore, cases decided during one administration might have arisen out of an assertion
of the privilege that originated in another administration. And in any event the frequency of the privilege's
assertion might have more to do without the number of cases challenging executive branch activity than a
particular administration's policy regarding use of the privilege. That said, Professor Chesney analyzed
these cases because they provide the only data on the privilege, and because even with the aforementioned
limitations they help to guide discussion of patterns in executive assertion of the privilege. Id. at 1302.
19 Professor Chesney did not think these numbers were significant, and in fact argued that they "do[]
not support the conclusion that the Bush Administration employs the privilege with greater secrecy than
prior administrations." Id. at 1301. We disagree with that conclusion.
20 The Executive sought outright dismissal in five cases between 1971 and 1980, nine cases between
1981 and 1990, 13 cases between 1991 and 2000, and 15 cases between 2001 and 2006. Id. at app.
21 Id.
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the reader a sense of the underlying controversy, the position taken by the Bush
Administration, and the courts' responses.
B. CHALLENGES TO EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has acknowledged that the "United States and
other countries have used 'renditions' to transport terrorist suspects from the country
where they were captured to their home country or to other countries where they can
be questioned, held or brought to justice."22 The United States denies, however, that
the purpose of rendition is to send suspected terrorists to countries that engage in
torture. 23 Two subjects of the extraordinary rendition program, Khaled El-Masri and
Maher Arar, claim that the United States mistakenly identified them as suspected ter-
rorists and sent them to countries where the U.S. government knew they would be
tortured. Both filed lawsuits in federal court against the United States and the private
contractors involved in the rendition. In both cases the United States filed motions to
dismiss on the ground that the very subject matter of the cases involved state secrets.
1. El-Masri v. Tenet
Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, filed a lawsuit against
CIA officials and private contractors alleging that he was transported against his will
to Afghanistan as part of the United States' extraordinary rendition program, and
that he was repeatedly interrogated, drugged, and tortured throughout his ordeal. 24
El-Masri claimed violations of his constitutional rights, as well as international legal
norms prohibiting prolonged, arbitrary detention and cruel, inhumane, and degrad-
ing treatment. 25
The United States filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that maintenance of the suit
would inevitably require disclosure of state secrets. The government asserted that "the
plaintiff's claim in this case plainly seeks to place at issue alleged clandestine foreign
intelligence activity that may neither be confirmed nor denied in the broader national
interest," but could not give more details about the potential damage because "even
stating precisely the harm that may result from further proceedings in this case is con-
trary to the national interest." 26 El-Masri responded that the government's practice of
extraordinary rendition, as well as his rendition specifically, had been widely discussed
in public. His counsel submitted evidence demonstrating that Secretary Rice, White
House Press Secretary Scott McClellan, and CIA Directors George Tenet and Porter
Goss had all publicly acknowledged that the United States conducts renditions, and
that El-Masri's rendition had been recounted in "numerous" media reports. 27 Thus,
22 Statement of Condoleezza Rice, Dec. 5, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/05/AR2005120500462.html. On September 6, 2006, President Bush publicly
acknowledged a CIA program of detaining and interrogating suspected terrorists in foreign locations. See
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007).
23 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 302.
24 El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 E Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006)
2s Specifically, El-Masri brought: (1) a Bivens claim against George Tenet, former Director of the CIA,
and unknown CIA agents for violations of his Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of his liberty
without due process and not to be subject to treatment that "shocks the conscience"; (2) a claim pursuant
to the Alien Tort Statute for violations of international legal norms prohibiting prolonged, arbitrary de-
tention; and (3) a claim pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute for each defendant's violation of international
legal norms prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
26 Motion to Dismiss at 11-12, El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 E Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006).
27 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 301.
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El-Masri argued that neither he nor the government needed to rely on privileged infor-
mation to make their respective cases.
Judge T.S. Ellis granted the government's motion and dismissed the case. Judge
Ellis observed that "courts must not blindly accept" the executive branch's assertion
of the privilege, but then stated that "courts must also bear in mind the Executive
Branch's preeminent authority over military and diplomatic matters and its greater
expertise relative to the judicial branch in predicting the effect of a particular disclo-
sure on national security." 28 Although the government had publicly acknowledged
that it engaged in rendition of suspected terrorists, Judge Ellis concluded that this
general information did not render the details of the program as it may have been ap-
plied to El-Masri less worthy of being kept classified. Judge Ellis then determined that
the case must be dismissed because the United States could not mount a defense with-
out the privileged information. 29 He rejected El-Masri's suggestion that the court es-
tablish protective procedures to allow the case to go forward, such as providing de-
fense counsel with clearance to review classified documents. Such measures would be
"plainly ineffective," Judge Ellis concluded, because the "entire aim of the suit is to
prove the existence of state secrets."30 Accordingly, "El-Masri's private interests must
give way to the national interest in preserving state secrets."31
El-Masri appealed the dismissal to the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district
court.3 2 Like Judge Ellis, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Bush Administration had
publicly acknowledged the existence of the CIA's extraordinary rendition program
generally, and that El-Masri's detention and rendition had been the subject of public
investigation and discussion.33 Nonetheless, the court held that El-Masri could not
demonstrate that the defendants were involved in his detention and interrogation
without relying on information constituting state secrets.34 The Fourth Circuit also
rejected El-Masri's suggestion that the privileged evidence be admitted under seal, to
be reviewed only by the court and El-Masri's counsel, who would first obtain the req-
uisite security clearance.35 The court explained that it "need not dwell long" on this
proposal, finding that such measures are "expressly foreclosed by Reynolds."3 6
2. Arar v. Ashcroft
Maher Arar's claims parallel those raised by Khaled El-Masri.3 7 Like El-Masri,
Arar alleged that he was abducted, detained, and then sent to another country where
he was tortured as part of the United States' practice of extraordinary rendition. Arar,
a Syrian-born Canadian citizen, was employed as a software engineer in Massachusetts.
In September 2002, he was vacationing abroad and was detained by U.S. authorities at
J.EK. International Airport in New York City while making a flight connection on his
way back to Canada. Federal officials took Arar into custody and held him for 13
2 El-Masri, 437 E Supp. 2d at 536.
29 Id. at 539.
30 Id. at 540.
31 Id. The district court did not address the United States' alternative argument that the case was
nonjusticiable pursuant to the "Totten bar." Id. at 540.
32 El-Masri, 479 E3d 296.
33 Id. at 302.
34 Id. at 308-10.
35 Id. at 311.
36 Id. at 311.
37 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 E Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y 2006).
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days. He was then flown by private jet to Amman, Jordan, where he was delivered to
Jordanian officials, who in turn brought him to Syria. In Syria, Arar was imprisoned
for a year in a small jail cell where he was beaten and tortured by Syrian security
forces. He claimed that his Syrian interrogators worked with U.S. officials, who pro-
vided information and questions and received reports from the Syrians about Arar's
responses. Arar was released on October 5, 2003. No charges were ever filed against
him. 38 On October 24, 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted in a hear-
ing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Arar's case was not "handled as
it should have been." 39
Arar filed suit in the Eastern District of New York claiming that his removal from
the United States violated his Fifth Amendment rights, as well as the Torture Victims
Protection Act and applicable treaties. Prior to discovery, the government moved for
dismissal or summary judgment on state secrets grounds. 40 The Administration's ar-
guments were identical to those made in El-Masri's case: the very subject matter of
the case concerned the details of a program that was secret, and needed to be kept that
way to safeguard national security. The government's reasons for detaining Arar, con-
cluding that he was a member of al Qaeda, and then sending him to Syria rather than
to Canada cannot be disclosed, the government argued, without jeopardizing national
security. Because information at the "core" of Arar's first three claims is a state secret,
the government argued that these claims must be dismissed.
The district court dismissed all of Arar's claims, holding that Arar could not seek
damages for violation of his constitutional rights "given the national security and
foreign policy considerations at stake." 41 Thus, although the court did not directly
address the Executive's claim that the case should also be dismissed on state secrets
grounds, the government's national security concerns were the basis for dismissal of
some of his claims. 42 A panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the
state secrets privilege again was a factor in its conclusion that Arar could not seek
damages from federal officials for violations of his constitutional rights. The Second
Circuit stated that assertion of the privilege serves as "a reminder of the undisputed
fact that the claims under consideration involve significant national security decisions
made in consultation with several foreign powers," and thus "constitutes a further
special factor counseling us to hesitate before creating a new cause of action or recog-
nizing one in a domain so clearly inhospitable to the fact-finding procedures and
methods of adjudication deployed by the federal courts."
In August 2008, the Second Circuit took the very unusual step of sua sponte grant-
ing rehearing en banc. Oral argument is scheduled for December 9, 2008.
38 In January 2007, a Canadian commission charged with investigating Canada's role in Arar's extra-
dition concluded that Canadian intelligence officials had erroneously linked Arar to al Qaeda, and then
provided that inaccurate information to their American counterparts. Canada issued an official apology
to Arar and awarded him approximately $10 million. See Scott Shane, Justice Dept. Investigating
Deportation to Syria, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at A6.
39 Rice Admits U.S. Erred in Deportation, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 25, 2007, at A10.
40 The government did not seek dismissal of Arar's fourth claim on state secrets grounds. That claim
concerned his alleged mistreatment while detained in the United States. The United States and the indi-
vidual defendants sought to dismiss that claim on other grounds.
41 Arar, 414 E Supp. 2d at 287.
42 Id.
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C. CHALLENGES TO THE NSA'S WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING
President Bush publicly acknowledged the existence of the NSA's warrantless wire-
tapping program in December 2005 after an article describing the practice appeared
in the New York Times. As the President explained at a press conference on December
19, 2005, he authorized the NSA to intercept communications for which there were
"reasonable grounds to believe that (1) the communication originated or terminated
outside the United States, and (2) a party to such communication is a member of al
Qaeda, a member of a group affiliated with al Qaeda, or an agent of al Qaeda or its
affiliates." Shortly thereafter, a number of different individuals who believed they had
been subjects of the warrantless wiretaps filed suit in federal court challenging the
legality of this practice.
1. Hepting v. AT&T Corporation
In Hepting v. AT&T Corporation,43 filed in the Northern District of California,
plaintiffs alleged that AT&T collaborated with the NSA to eavesdrop on the commu-
nications of millions of Americans. The complaint asserted that AT&T, acting as an
agent of the U.S. government, violated the First and Fourth Amendment rights of U.S.
citizens, as well as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and various other
state and federal laws. Plaintiffs sought damages, restitution, disgorgement, and in-
junctive and declaratory relief on behalf of the class.t The United States sought to
intervene and moved for dismissal or summary judgment on the basis of the state se-
crets privilege, for three reasons: first, because the "very subject matter of [the action]"
concerns privileged information, second, because the plaintiffs could not make their
prima facie case without the privileged information, and third, because the absence of
the privileged information would deprive AT&T of a defense.45 In addition, because
the case concerned a covert agreement between AT&T and the government, the United
States contended that it qualified for dismissal under Totten v. United States.
Judge Vaughn Walker denied the government's motion, explaining that there was a
great deal of publicly available information about the NSA terrorist surveillance pro-
gram that cut against application of the "Totten bar." 46 Turning to the state secrets
privilege, the court noted as a threshold matter that "no case dismissed because its
'very subject matter' was a state secret involved ongoing, widespread violations of
individual constitutional rights," as were alleged here, but instead most cases con-
cerned "classified details about either a highly technical invention or a covert espio-
nage relationship." 47 In addition, the court stated that the "very subject matter of this
action is hardly a secret" because "public disclosures by the government and AT&T
indicate that AT&T is assisting the government to implement some kind of surveil-
lance program." 48 Finally, Judge Walker concluded that it was "premature" to decide
whether the case should be dismissed on the ground that plaintiffs could not make out
a prima facie case or AT&T could not assert a valid defense. 49 Instead, he decided to
let discovery proceed and then assess whether any information withheld pursuant to
the state secrets privilege would require the suit's dismissal. In conclusion, Judge
" Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 E Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
44 Id. at 979.
45 Id. at 979, 985.
46 Id. at 993.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 994.
49 Id.
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Walker commented that he viewed the state secrets privilege as limited, at least in
part, by the role of the judiciary in the constitutional structure:
[I]t is important to note that even the state secrets privilege has its
limits. While the court recognizes and respects the executive's con-
stitutional duty to protect the nation from threats, the court also
takes seriously its constitutional duty to adjudicate the disputes
that come before it.... To defer to a blanket assertion of secrecy
here would be to abdicate that duty.... so
The decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On August 21, 2008, a panel of the
Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court "in light of the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008.""
2. ACLU v. NSA
ACLU v. NSA was filed by a group of journalists, academics, attorneys, and non-
profit organizations.5 2 The plaintiffs regularly communicate with individuals from the
Middle East whom the government might suspect of being affiliated with al Qaeda,
and thus they claimed a "well-founded belief" that their telephone calls and internet
communications have been intercepted under the NSA's warrantless wiretapping pro-
gram. They contended that even the possibility that the government is eavesdropping
on their calls has a chilling effect on their communications and thus disrupts their
ability to talk to clients, sources, witnesses, and generally engage in advocacy and
scholarship.53 Plaintiffs brought suit in federal court in the Eastern District of
Michigan challenging the surveillance program as a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine, their First and Fourth Amendment rights, FISA, and other federal
laws. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would prevent the NSA from
eavesdropping on domestic communication without a warrant.
The United States filed a motion to dismiss very similar to that in Hepting. The
Executive conceded that the "issues before the Court" regarding the constitutionality
of the NSA's surveillance program "are obviously significant and of considerable pub-
lic interest."5 4 But it contended that these questions cannot be explored in litigation
because disclosure of the "intelligence activities, information, sources, and methods"
relevant to the litigation would jeopardize national security. Without this evidence,
the Executive claimed that plaintiffs could neither establish standing to sue nor prove
the merits of their claims. Furthermore, the Executive argued that the "very subject
matter" of the lawsuit is a state secret, and thus asserted that the litigation must be
dismissed, or alternatively the court should grant defendants' motion for summary
judgment. 6
so Id. at 995 (internal citations omitted).
si Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 E3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
52 ACLU v. NSA, 438 E Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
5 Complaint at 2, ACLU v. NSA, 438 E Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
54 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the United States' Assertion of the Military
and State Secrets Privilege; Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment;
and Defendants' Motion to Stay Consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, ACLU
v. NSA, 438 E Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
ss Id. at 4.
56 Id. at 5.
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The plaintiffs responded that the Executive's public statements acknowledging the
existence of the NSA's surveillance program were sufficient to determine their stand-
ing and the lawfulness of the program. The government, however, strongly disagreed:
"[T]o decide this case on the scant record offered by Plaintiffs, and to consider the
extraordinary measure of enjoining the intelligence tools authorized by the President
to detect a foreign terrorist threat on that record, would be profoundly inappropriate."s7
The government argued that the President's exercise of his "core Article II and statu-
tory powers to protect the Nation from attack" cannot be resolved on the basis of the
public record alone."
On August 17, 2006, Judge Anna Diggs Taylor rejected the government's claim that
the case should be dismissed on state secrets grounds, and found the NSA's warrantless
wiretapping program to be unconstitutional. 9 The government's attempt to have the
case dismissed prior to discovery suggested to Judge Taylor that the government was
arguing that the case was not justiciable under the Totten doctrine. Judge Taylor con-
cluded, however, that the Totten bar was not applicable because the case did not con-
cern an "espionage relationship between the Plaintiff and the Government," as had
been the case in Totten and in the most recent application of that doctrine in Tenet v.
Doe.60 Following the lead of Judge Walker, Judge Taylor reviewed the aspects of NSA's
warrantless wiretappingprogram that had been publicly admitted by the Administration,
and the defense of that program that the Administration had articulated thus far. She
concluded that plaintiffs' challenge to the program could be resolved based on the
Executive's on-the-record statements, and that neither the plaintiffs nor the govern-
ment needed to discuss the allegedly privileged details of the program to pursue the
litigation.6 1 For those reasons, Judge Taylor denied the government's motion to dismiss
or for summary judgment, and went on to address the merits of the constitutional and
statutory challenges to the NSA warrantless wiretapping program.
The Executive filed an appeal in the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the district court
and concluded the plaintiffs lacked standing to litigate their claims. The Sixth Circuit
agreed with the lower court that because the government had acknowledged engaging
in warrantless wiretapping, the case could not be dismissed on the ground that the
subject matter of the lawsuit was a state secret. 62 But the Sixth Circuit concluded that
the state secrets privilege applied to bar disclosure of documents that could have es-
tablished standing. Without such records, the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that
their own communications had been intercepted by the NSA. 63
D. CONCLUSION
The state secrets privilege has strayed far from the narrow evidentiary privilege
described in Reynolds, and is now being asserted as a basis for dismissal of entire
categories of litigation challenging government programs. Reynolds admonished that
the privilege is "not to be lightly invoked," and yet it is now cited regularly by the
government in numerous cases. As one commentator put it, the state secrets privilege
s7 Id. at 3.
s8 Id.
s9 ACLU, 438 E Supp. 2d 754.
60 Id. at 763.
61 Id. at 765-66.
62 ACLU, 493 E3d at 650 n.2.
63 Id. at 653.
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has been "transform[ed] from a narrow evidentiary privilege into something that
looks like a doctrine of broad government immunity."64
IV THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND THE COURTS
The cases described above demonstrate that many judges readily defer to executive
claims of privilege. Judges explain that they are ill-equipped to determine whether the
information sought in discovery would undermine relations with foreign govern-
ments, put informants at risk, or alert terrorists to government surveillance. Judges
repeatedly assert that they must defer to the executive because they lack the ability to
make independent judgments about the executive's claimed need for the privilege, and
frankly concede that they are reluctant second-guess the executive's assertions that
disclosure will put the nation at risk.
But the executive is also not a good judge of the need for the privilege. When high-
ranking government officials are sued for violating the law, they have an obvious self-
interest in avoiding scrutiny of their actions and the liability that might follow.
Although there have been many legitimate assertions of the privilege, the executive
has also been known to overuse the privilege to avoid the embarrassment, cost, and
hassle of litigation. Indeed, Reynolds itself is claimed to have been just such a case.
Although the United States had asserted that the accident investigation report sought
in that case contained state secrets, when the report was eventually declassified many
years later, a leading expert on the case observed that the report "revealed ... serious
negligence by the government" but "nothing that could be called state secrets. "6
Judges cannot simply accept sweeping executive claims of privilege, because to do so
would be to allow the executive to serve as judge and jury in its own case.
As James Madison explained, the federal courts play an essential role in checking
the power of the executive, thereby preventing the "tyranny" that results from the "ac-
cumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands." 66
Indeed, the Framers of the Constitution provided federal judges with life tenure and
salary protections in part to ensure that courts can block legislative and executive
branch overreaching without fear of retribution. When courts dismiss cases challeng-
ing the legality of executive conduct, they have abdicated this vital role in the tripar-
tite system of government.
Of particular importance is the federal judicial role in safeguarding individual
constitutional rights against executive abuse of power-issues directly implicated by
challenges to extraordinary rendition and warrantless wiretapping. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly asserted its power to review constitutional claims, despite execu-
tive and legislative attempts to strip courts of jurisdiction, observing that "serious
constitutional questions [] would arise" if a plaintiff were denied "any judicial forum
for a colorable constitutional claim."6 7 In the leading case on this question, Webster v.
Doe, the government made many of the same arguments against judicial review that
it raises in cases challenging extraordinary rendition and warrantless wiretapping. In
Webster, a former CIA employee challenged his termination on the ground that it vio-
lated his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. The government
64 Henry Lanman, Secret Guarding, SLATE, May 22, 2006, available at http://www.slate.com/
id/2142155.
s See Fisher, supra note 2, at xi.
66 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
67 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (citing Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476
U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)).
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responded that no court could review the decision to terminate Webster, arguing that
"judicial review even of constitutional claims will entail extensive 'rummaging around'
in the Agency's affairs to the detriment of national security." The Court rejected this
argument, concluding that the need for a judicial forum in which to litigate constitu-
tional claims was too weighty an interest to preclude litigation entirely, and explained
that the district court could control discovery so as to "balance [the employee's] need
for access to proof ... against the extraordinary needs of the CIA for confidentiality
and the protection of its methods, sources, and mission." 9 The recent decisions deny-
ing plaintiffs a forum in which to litigate their claims challenging the constitutionality
of extraordinary rendition and warrantless wiretapping are incompatible with this
long tradition of judicial protection of individual rights.
Plaintiffs challenging warrantless wiretapping claim that the practice exceeds stat-
utory as well as constitutional limits, and thus these cases should be even harder for
courts to dismiss without review. Congress enacted FISA precisely to limit executive
power to monitor the communications of those within the United States.70 When
courts dismiss claims that FISA has been violated, they undermine Congress's author-
ity as well as their own, rendering laws like FISA a nullity. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly rejected the executive's attempt to assume the unilateral power to decide
for itself what the law requires. As the Court explained in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, "it
would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen
could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention
by his government, simply because the Executive opposes making available such a
challenge."7 1 Likewise, the executive cannot be allowed to ignore the limitations im-
posed by federal law and then seek to avoid judicial review entirely on the ground that
the case concerns a "state secret."
Although the federal courts may not have the expertise to determine in every case
which information constitutes a state secret, they are well-equipped to apply safe-
guards and protective procedures that would allow litigation to proceed without jeop-
ardizing national security. Indeed, courts have done so on a regular basis for decades.
Long before the Bush Administration took office, courts responded to the Executive's
claimed need for secrecy in challenges to the CIA's employment practices, in Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) cases, and in countless criminal cases. Such cases were not
dismissed on the pleadings. Rather, courts applied longstanding litigation tools de-
signed to allow litigation to proceed while at the same time safeguarding national se-
curity. For example, courts can require the executive to submit allegedly classified
documents in camera, so that only the court can review them to determine whether
the documents can be withheld from the opposing party. So too, courts can allow at-
torneys who hold appropriate security clearances to review classified materials on
behalf of their clients. In FOIA cases, the government has long been required to gener-
ate an index describing each document withheld and explaining the basis for the ex-
ecutive's claim that its disclosure would harm national security 7 2 This procedure al-
lows both the court and the opposing party to determine which documents are truly
relevant and to challenge the basis for the executive's claim that the documents must
68 Id. at 604 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-13).
69 Id. at 604.
70 Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 806-08 (1989).
71 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536-37 (2004).
72 See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 E2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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remain secret. Finally, courts regularly mandate that the United States segregate any
non-classified material from classified documents to provide the opposing party with
as much information as possible.73
Significantly, courts and Congress have successfully worked together in the past to
manage classified evidence in criminal prosecutions. In 1980, Congress enacted the
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) to balance the government's interest in
protecting such information from disclosure against criminal defendants' need to ob-
tain all information relevant to their defense. Under CIPA, the court responds to a
defense request for classified documents by first determining whether the evidence
sought is relevant and material. If so, the burden shifts to the government to show that
the information contains sensitive information about national security that cannot be
publicly disclosed. 7 4 Even if the government satisfies its burden, the information is not
completely withheld from the defendant. Rather, the court decides whether a modifi-
cation or substitute for the evidence is possible. CIPA requires the government to pro-
duce redacted versions of documents, submit a summary of the information in the
classified documents, or substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the clas-
sified documents would prove.75 If the government fails to provide a sufficient substi-
tute for the requested documents, the court may dismiss specified counts or even the
entire prosecution.7 6 Similar procedures should be followed in the context of civil
cases, as is proposed in pending legislation that is described in more detail below.
In sum, there are many steps short of outright dismissal that judges can take to
protect state secrets from public disclosure. At the very least, judges should allow
discovery to proceed in some fashion before deciding whether the "very subject mat-
ter" of the case requires its dismissal. What courts should not do is find that executive
claims of privilege are grounds for immediate dismissal of entire categories of cases
challenging the legality of executive conduct. The dismissals are particularly egre-
gious considering that the Bush Administration has expressly conceded the existence
of both the NSA's warrantless wiretapping and the practice of extraordinary rendi-
tion, albeit only after journalists uncovered the practices and pressed the Administration
to justify them. These activities are public, not secret, and determining their legality is
important not just to those harmed by them, but to all who might be in the future. It
is time the courts determined the legality of executive conduct rather than ducking
these questions at the executive's behest.
V THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND THE NEW
ADMINISTRATION
A. THE NEED FOR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO REFORM THE PRIVILEGE
The next presidential administration should reform the use of the state secrets
privilege. By adopting some or all of the steps proposed below, the new administra-
tion can ensure that the coordinate branches of government are able to fulfill their
constitutional roles. These measures will reduce inter-branch friction, restore
Congress's and the courts' trust in the executive branch, and ensure that Americans
are not denied justice by their own government.
73 See, e.g., Schiller v. NLRB, 964 E2d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
74 See United States v. Yunis, 867 E2d 617, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
7s 18 U.S.C. App. 5 4.
76 18 U.S.C. App. 5 6.
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As scholars, lawyers, and policymakers have recognized, the executive branch can
place its programs on firmer ground, and better protect both the nation's security and
liberty, through working with and not against the coordinate branches of government.
Jack Goldsmith, a former senior official in the Bush Pentagon and Justice Department,
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee last year that "[t]he administration's
failure to engage Congress deprived the country of national debates about the nature
of the threat and its proper response that would have served an educative and legiti-
mating function regardless of what emerged from the process." As Professor
Goldsmith explained, "[w]hen the Executive branch forces Congress to deliberate,
argue, and take a stand, it spreads accountability and minimizes the recriminations
and other bad effects of the risk taking that the President's job demands."78 Just as an
extreme unilateralist approach with respect to Congress ultimately undermines au-
thority and support for administration programs, so too will an administration's ef-
forts to limit the role of the courts through excessive use of the state secrets privilege
eventually backfire.
When the executive branch deprives courts of the ability to perform their constitu-
tional job of interpreting the law and administering justice, it calls into question the
legal basis for its programs, and cause judges and the public at large to question
whether the executive branch is operating in good faith. This may, over time, lead to a
"boy who cried wolf" scenario where the executive cannot rely on the privilege in a
situation in which it is truly necessary. Indeed, Maher Arar's case illustrates the grow-
ing skepticism regarding the Bush Administration's assertion of the privilege. Even as
the government was claiming that Arar's case could not proceed because it might
damage U.S. relations with Canada, the Canadian government was holding public
hearings on the matter, and ultimately issued an apology to Arar and awarded him
approximately $10 million.7 9 Distrust of the Administration's claimed need for secre-
cy may have been the basis for the Second Circuit's highly unusual decision to sua
sponte grant rehearing en banc of an appellate panel's dismissal of Arar's case. If the
new administration wishes to avoid judicial and legislative second-guessing of its
claims of privilege, it should better police its assertions of the privilege.
B. SPECIFIC MEASURES THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SHOULD ADOPT
The next administration should consider implementing the following measures
upon taking office. These proposals could be adopted individually, or grouped to-
gether as a comprehensive package. The list below is not intended to be exhaustive,
but rather to suggest useful avenues for the new administration to pursue.
First, the new administration should conduct an across-the-board review of all
pending litigation in which the government-either as a party or an intervenor-has
invoked the state secrets privilege. Just because the Bush Administration invoked the
privilege in a particular case does not mean the new administration should consider
itself bound by its predecessor's litigation approach. This across-the-board review
should be carried out by a joint group of career employees and political appointees of
the new administration, and should include officials from both the Justice Department
and the intelligence and national security communities. It should cover not only cases
n Testimony of Jack Goldsmith on "Preserving the Rule of Law in the Fight Against Terrorism"
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 2, 2007) (hereinafter Goldsmith Testimony), available at
http://judiciarysenate.gov/testimonycfm?id=2958&wit-id=6693.
78 Id.
7 See Shane, supra note 38.
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that are pending in district courts, but also those in which the state secrets privilege is
at issue on appeal.
Second, the next president should issue an executive order, binding on all federal
agencies, that sets out substantive legal standards regarding use of the privilege. This
order might include a new definition of what constitutes a state secret and what evi-
dence the government believes is appropriately subject to the privilege, based either on
the current classification system,o or the definitions of "state secrets" in proposed
legislation that is currently pending before Congress. An important element of an
executive order on the privilege would be creating a standard for when the government
may seek outright dismissal of a case, at the pleadings stage, on the basis of the privi-
lege. For example, an effective order could emphasize that this approach is supported
by precedent only in cases involving secret espionage agreements, such as those at is-
sue in Totten v. United States and Tenet v. Doe, and may not be appropriate in cases
relating to other subjects. The executive order should take into account the harm to
litigants and the public of invoking the privilege either to prevent introduction of evi-
dence or seek dismissal of the case. The president's constitutional responsibilities in-
clude not only protecting the nation's security, but also taking care that the laws are
properly enforced." If important evidence is kept out of court, or entire cases are
dismissed on the pleadings, the law cannot be optimally followed and enforced.
Accordingly, the executive branch should adopt a substantive standard that requires it
to evaluate the harm that will result when invoking the state secrets privilege.
Third, either as part of an executive order or through a formal memorandum is-
sued by the new attorney general, the administration should create a durable and ex-
tensive review process within the executive branch for deciding when to assert the
privilege in future cases. Internal procedural requirements within the bureaucracy can
create a strong layer of checks and balances, taking advantage of the benefits of mul-
tiple viewpoints and the experience and judgment of career civil servants.8 2 When just
a few executive branch officials make decisions without broader consultation and in-
put, the results can be severely flawed. This is especially the case with complex legal
analysis, as demonstrated by the failures resulting from the Bush Administration's
refusal to seek input from different officials within the administration.83 As Professor
Goldsmith testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, "[cilose-looped decision-
making by like-minded lawyers resulted in legal and political errors that would be
very costly to the administration down the road. Many of these errors were unneces-
sary and would have been avoided with wider deliberation and consultation."8 4
Judicial doctrine provides that the state secrets privilege may only be "lodged by
the head of the department which has control over the matter"-not
s0 See Exec. Order No. 13292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003) (specifying classification
guidelines).
81 See U.S. CONST., Art. II, 5 3 (the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed").
" See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) (arguing that the bureaucracy can serve as a "critical mecha-
nism to promote internal separation of powers" in part because it "contains agencies with differing mis-
sions and objectives that intentionally overlap to create friction.").
83 See Goldsmith Testimony, supra note 79 ("For example, the controversial interrogation opinion of
August 1, 2002, was not circulated for comments to the State Department, which had expertise on the
meaning of torture and the consequences of adopting particular interpretations of torture. Another ex-
ample is the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). Before I arrived at OLC, the NSA General Counsel did
not have access to OLC's legal analysis related to the TSE").
84 Id.
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a low-level official." That official must give "actual personal consideration" to the
issue, and attest to this in a formal declaration." Recent practice suggests, however,
that these doctrinal procedural requirements are insufficient in light of the significant
impact of invocation of the privilege. And although officials from the Bush Justice
Department have asserted that attorneys from the Department, in addition to counsel
from the relevant agency, are involved in determining when to invoke the privilege,
they have not indicated the existence of any formal review process within the Justice
Department. 7
The new administration or Justice Department should institute a formal process
for invoking the privilege, by setting out a list of offices or officials who must sign off
on the decision. To begin, a senior official within the Department, perhaps the deputy
attorney general, should be required to personally approve all invocations of the privi-
lege. This will provide accountability for secrecy at the highest levels of the adminis-
tration. Moreover, a new review process might include a referral to the Department's
Professional Responsibility Advisory Office (PRAO) to ensure that the privilege is not
being invoked out of a conflict of interest." Further, the Justice Department should
consider establishing a litigant's ombudsman who could serve as an advocate for the
members of the public who would be harmed by invocation of the privilege." By re-
quiring that these offices approve the government's exercise of the privilege, the new
administration would bring more viewpoints into its deliberations and reduce the
likelihood of error or unnecessary harm to the interests of justice.
Fourth, the administration should institute a system to automatically refer evi-
dence that it asserts is privileged to an Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Even if
the privilege is invoked appropriately and narrowly by the administration, and sub-
jected to careful review by the courts, the state secrets privilege will prevent the intro-
duction of some important evidence in court. This is the very purpose of the privilege,
and it may sometimes be necessary to prevent the disclosure of secret information that
would harm the nation's security-even when that evidence demonstrates illegal activ-
ity. Because even proper use of the privilege can disrupt the usual system of checks and
balances and limit oversight of the executive branch, it is important that an indepen-
dent body within the executive branch review the evidence and take action to prevent
or ameliorate violations of the law that cannot be disclosed in court. By mandating
referral of assertedly privileged evidence to an OIG, the new administration can
s See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953).
86 Id.
1 See Letter from Michael Mukasey, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Sen. Patrick Leahy (Mar. 31, 2008) (hereinaf-
ter Mukasey Letter) (asserting that "[s]everal procedural and substantive requirements preclude the state
secrets privilege from being lightly invoked or accepted" but not delineating any within the Justice
Department); Statement of Carl J. Nichols, Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen., Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary
(Feb. 13, 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2008/021308nichols.html ("In practice, satis-
fying these requirements typically involves many layers of substantive review and protection. The agency
with control over the information at issue reviews the information internally to determine if a privilege
assertion is necessary and appropriate. That process typically involves considerable review by agency
counsel and officials. Once that review is completed, the agency head-such as the Director of National
Intelligence or the Attorney General-must personally satisfy himself or herself that the privilege should
be asserted.").
8 See Professional Responsibility Advisory Office Website, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/prao/
mission.htm (stating that the mission of PRAO includes providing "definitive advice to government at-
torneys and the leadership at the Department on issues relating to professional responsibility").
89 A model for this would be the Justice Department's Office of the Victims' Rights Ombudsman. See
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/vr/index.html (describing that office's mission and operations).
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ensure that any evidence of abuse or wrongdoing-even if properly covered by the
privilege-will be addressed and corrected. The Justice Department's OIG has dem-
onstrated extraordinary integrity and independence in recent years, and thus would be
the appropriate office to conduct the review. However, if the administration believes it
appropriate, the privileged evidence could be referred to the relevant department or
agency OIG, for example that within the Department of Defense or the CIA. The OIG
could then serve as a partial substitute for the courts by investigating and providing
accountability for any wrongdoing revealed by the privileged evidence.
Finally, the new administration should encourage the next Congress to enact the
State Secrets Protection Act, discussed below, or similar legislation. Rather than work
with Congress to craft state secrets legislation, the Bush Administration has attempt-
ed to undermine the proposed legislation by making specious attacks on its constitu-
tionality and vowing to veto any bill passed by Congress.90 The new administration
should work with members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees to pass
and sign into law the State Secrets Protection Act. At a minimum, it should cooperate
with the Judiciary Committees to modify these bills to address its concerns. The next
section discusses the legislation and its benefits in more detail.
Adopting these measures would enable the new administration to restore a proper
balance between the branches of government, fulfill its constitutional responsibilities to
enforce the rule of law, and protect both national security and the interests of justice.
VI. THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND CONGRESS
Congress also has the power to shape the judicial response to the state secrets privi-
lege, and a bipartisan group of legislators has recently introduced legislation seeking
to do so. In January 2008, Senators Edward Kennedy, Patrick Leahy, and Arlen Specter
introduced the State Secrets Protection Act,91 which is a bill to regulate the use of the
state secrets privilege. The Act was voted out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, but
did not reach the floor. The House of Representatives also introduced a Bill to reform
the use of the state secrets privilege, which was recently approved by the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties. 92
Although these bills likely will not be enacted into law by this Congress, we hope simi-
lar legislation will be revived by a future Congress to provide much-needed guidance
to courts struggling to resolve blanket assertions of privilege.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE STATE SECRETS PROTECTION ACT
This section will briefly describe the Senate version of the State Secrets Protection
Act, S. 2533, which is quite similar to the bill pending in the House. The Act states
that a court shall not dismiss a case on state secrets grounds prior to holding a hearing
on the matter. As is already the case, the Act requires that the government provide an
affidavit, signed by the head of the executive branch agency responsible for the infor-
mation, explaining the factual basis for the claim of privilege. In addition, the govern-
ment must make all the evidence it claims is subject to the privilege available for re-
view by the judge, together with an index explaining the basis for withholding each
item of evidence. For each item the government asserts is privileged, the court must
90 See Mukasey Letter, supra note 89.
91 The State Secrets Protection Act of 2008, S. 2533, 110th Cong.
92 The State Secrets Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 6507, 110th Cong.
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determine whether the claim is valid, and whether it is possible to segregate and dis-
close non-privileged evidence.
If the court agrees with the government that material evidence is privileged, the
Act provides that it should then attempt to craft a non-privileged substitute that will
allow the case to go forward. This portion of the Act is modeled after CIPA, described
in more detail above, which has proven effective in governing the use of classified evi-
dence in criminal cases. For example, the court might order the government to provide
a summary of the privileged information, or a statement admitting relevant facts es-
tablished by the privileged information. If the government refuses to comply with
such an instruction, the court must resolve the disputed question of fact or law to
which the evidence relates in favor of the plaintiff. If, however, the court concludes
that material evidence is privileged and a substitute is not possible, it may dismiss the
claim if it concludes that, in the absence of evidence, the defendant would be unable
to pursue a valid defense to the claim.
If attorneys for the nongovernmental parties obtain security clearance, the Act
states that they may review the affidavits and motions, and participate in the hearings.
The court also has the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem with the necessary
clearance to represent a party at a hearing on the privilege, and to stay proceedings
while an attorney applies for such a security clearance. Finally, the Act provides that
the attorney general report to Congress any assertion of the state secrets privilege so
that Congress can monitor its use.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATE SECRETS PROTECTION ACT
Some have argued that the state secrets privilege is rooted in the executive's consti-
tutional role as commander-in-chief, and thus contend that this legislation might im-
permissibly encroach on executive authority.93 The Supreme Court has never held that
the privilege is constitutionally required, however, or that it is within the exclusive
control of the executive branch. In Reynolds, the United States argued that it had
"inherent" power to withhold information that it claimed contained claimed secrets,
but the Court expressly eschewed reliance on this "broad proposition[]." 94 The Court
made clear that the judiciary should not blindly accept the executive's assertions of
the privilege, but rather declared that the "court itself must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege."95 In short, administration
of the privilege has always been shared by the executive and judicial branches, and the
Constitution certainly does not bar Congress from playing an active role as well.
Moreover, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches have a long tradition of
working together to provide access to information for litigants without jeopardizing
national security. For example, FOIA provides that the government may withhold
from public disclosure information that has been classified under Executive Order, but
gives the courts the authority to decide de novo whether the classification is reason-
able.9 6 FOIA requires that administrative agencies segregate all non-classified material
from classified documents, and assigns courts the task of ensuring that agencies have
disclosed all "reasonably segregable" portions of classified records.97 Likewise, CIPA
9' See Mukasey Letter, supra note 89.
94 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6 n.9.
9S Id. at 8.
96 5 U.S.C. 5 552(b)(1).
97 5 U.S.C. 5 552(b). See also Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law v. Office of the Trade Representative, 505 E
Supp.2d 150, 158 (D.D.C. 2007) (stating that even when documents are classified, and thus exempt under
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demonstrates that it is possible to enact legislation that protects sensitive information
without sacrificing either national security or the role of the courts in upholding the
law. The State Secrets Protection Act is a useful addition to this existing body of leg-
islation, the constitutionality of which is well-established.
C. MERITS OF THE STATE SECRETS PROTECTION ACT
The pending legislation would accomplish a number of important objectives. First,
by setting out parameters for use of the privilege, the Act would ensure that most
cases challenging the legality of government conduct will proceed despite the presence
of privileged information, and will do so without jeopardizing national security.
Using CIPA as its model, the Act would provide judges with several different options
as to how to proceed when the executive raises a claim that relevant evidence contains
state secrets. These guidelines would assist the courts and litigants as they seek to find
a means to litigate cases that involve evidence relating to national security, rather than
leaving them to flounder under the ad hoc procedures and varying standards employed
by the courts today.
Second, the Act would ensure that sensitive national security information will not
be publicly disclosed. The Act provides the same security safeguards that have proven
effective in CIPA cases, and prevents privileged evidence from ever being produced. At
the same time, the Act attempts to ameliorate the impact this might have on innocent
litigants as much as is possible.
Third, the Act would require the attorney general to report within 30 days to the
House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees each instance in which the
United States claims the privilege. In the unusual circumstance that a case must be
dismissed due to the sensitive nature of evidence vital to a valid defense, Congress
would be alerted to the problem and would be able to engage in the executive over-
sight that is no longer possible in court.
Finally, the Act would reestablish Congress's role in regulating the cases that come
before federal courts and the evidence that can be heard in such cases. Under Article
I, Section 8, and Article III, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has broad
authority both to grant federal courts jurisdiction over cases challenging executive
conduct and to establish rules regarding the evidence that may be presented in such
litigation. Indeed, Congress has always taken an active role in providing for rules re-
garding the admission of evidence in federal court, as illustrated by FOIA, CIPA, and
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Furthermore, Congress is ideally situated to craft pro-
cedures to protect national security information without sacrificing litigants' rights to
hold the executive accountable for violations of federal law. The State Secrets
Protection Act provides a systematic approach that takes into account both the secu-
rity of the country and the interests of litigants, and would provide essential guidance
to courts struggling with this issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Bush Administration's assertions of the state secrets privilege as grounds for
immediate dismissal of challenges to the government's use of extraordinary rendition
and warrantless wiretapping are unprecedented. Although the Administration has ac-
knowledged both programs exist, and even revealed details of how they operate, it
FOIA, the government must disclose all reasonably segregable non-classified information within those
documents).
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nonetheless claims that the very subject matter of the litigation is too sensitive to un-
dergo judicial review. In short, the privilege is no longer being used to exclude docu-
ments from litigation, as in Reynolds, but rather now is asserted as a bar to any judi-
cial review of executive conduct in these areas. The transformation of the privilege
into a claim of immunity is not supported by Supreme Court jurisprudence and is
incompatible with the judicial role in overseeing the executive branch.
Fortunately, there is no need to choose between full disclose of state secrets on the
one hand or immediate dismissal of all pending litigation challenging these programs
on the other. A middle ground exists that can accommodate both interests. Courts can
respond to assertions of the privilege by structuring discovery so as to balance the
need for secrecy against the rights of litigants. Judges have long crafted special proce-
dures to protect privileged material, such as by requiring redactions, summaries, in-
dexes, and other modifications to discovery requests, and these same techniques
should be employed in cases in which the government raises the state secrets privilege.
The executive branch can take steps internally to clarify the appropriate standards for
assertion of the privilege and increase the participation of all relevant parties in mak-
ing the decision to invoke the privilege. Finally, Congress can pass legislation such as
the State Secrets Protection Act to protect both the interests of litigants and secret
national security information.
